"Governing Well after War:

How Improving Female Representation Prolongs Post-conflict Peace"

(Short title for running header: "Governing Well after War")

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Abstract: Previous studies suggest that women's access to political power often increases following the termination of civil conflicts, particularly those ending in negotiated settlement. However, the effect of these changes has received limited attention. We argue that the proportion of female representatives in a national legislature prolongs peace following a negotiated settlement. Moreover, we highlight two mechanisms through which greater female representation reduces the risk of conflict recurrence: 1) by prioritizing social welfare spending over military spending, and 2) by improving public perceptions of good governance and the credibility of political elites. We further argue that legislative independence and authority conditions this relationship, implying that greater female representation is more likely to promote peace in states with nominally democratic political institutions. Our empirical analyses of peace duration following negotiated settlements between 1946 and 2011 provide robust support for our general argument and the underlying mechanisms we believe drive this relationship.

Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition.

Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop).

"[I]f women were fully engaged in all these aspects of peacebuilding, they would help prevent the impunity that undermines efforts to re-establish the rule of law…in governance, if women were engaged in policy decision-making and employed in public administration, we would see more diversity expressed in policy making and more attention to community and family needs."[1]

-Chilean President and former executive director of UN Women Michelle Bachelet

Gender[2] inclusivity—particularly the incorporation of women into both peace processes and post-conflict political decision-making—has been promoted by the international community through measures such as United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and implemented in various ways in many states at risk of or emerging from instability and violence. Through such mechanisms, the UN and its member states have highlighted the disproportionate impact of war on the lives of women and called attention to the important roles women can play in conflict resolution and the maintenance of peace. The rationale behind UNSCR 1325, as emphasized by the statement above from then-UN Women executive director Michelle Bachelet, implicitly asserts that peace is more fragile when women, their perspectives, and their preferences are excluded from the political process and from political decision-making.

Previous studies demonstrate that women's status in society plays an important role in the production and resolution of political violence (e.g., Hudson et al. 2009) and that women's access to political power often increases following the termination of violent civil conflict (e.g., Hughes and Tripp 2015). Yet, few studies have directly examined the influence of increasing gender diversity

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[1] Greeting to the World Peace Festival, August 20-27, 2011, Berlin, Germany. Available:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zh0lcNJmLQ0&index=19&list=PLxWil8G-73_J5d-tvX3I-vaNfJemwjR_I

[2] While recognizing the distinction between gender (as a social construct) and sex, we follow existing studies in the literature on "politics and gender" and use the term "gender" to refer to biological gender, which reflects the physical attributes of an individual at birth.

within national political intuitions on peace and conflict processes.[3] Here, we consider the potential influence of greater incorporation of women in national legislatures on the duration of peace in states emerging from violent civil conflict. States emerging from such conflicts—particularly those terminating in a negotiated settlement—face a persistent risk of conflict relapse. Large-scale internal conflict produces grievances, underdevelopment, and mistrust among recent adversaries, which in turn raises the risk of future episodes of violence (Collier et al. 2003; Walter 2014). Breaking this "conflict trap" necessitates interventions that can effectively address the underlying conditions that drive this cycle. As we argue below, increasing female representation within national legislatures represents one potentially fruitful intervention to increase peace durability.

In contrast to previous studies addressing related questions (e.g., Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly 2015; Ruddick 1995), we make no assumptions regarding women's inherent pacifistic attitudes per se. Similarly, while acknowledging the important role that societal gender norms play in shaping the risk of violent conflict (Caprioli 2005; Hudson et al. 2009; Melander 2005), we place female political elites at the forefront of the argument by identifying and recognizing their potential agency in peace processes. In brief, we argue that legislatures with larger proportions of female representatives positively influence the durability of peace through two mechanisms: 1) by prioritizing social welfare spending over military spending, and 2) by positively influencing public perceptions of governance quality and elite credibility. In building our argument, we rely on literature linking good governance to state stability and the duration of post-conflict peace, as well as studies highlighting gender-based differences in policy preferences and public perceptions of female elites. We also consider the conditioning impact of a post-conflict state's political institutions on the relationship between female representation and peace durability. Specifically, legislatures exert greater influence over policy and are typically perceived to be more credible in states with nominally

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[3] For a review of the literature on the positivist study of women and conflict, see Reiter (2015).

democratic formal political institutions. Consequently, we expect that the influence of female representation on peace durability is strongest in more democratic states because it is under these conditions that female legislators are more likely to shape policy and influence public perceptions.

We examine the validity of our argument using cross-national data on the proportion of women in national legislative bodies and the duration of peace following civil conflicts terminated via negotiated settlement between 1946 and 2011. The results of our empirical analysis provide strong support for our central argument: rising female representation rates increase the durability of peace following conflicts terminated via negotiated settlements, especially in states with more democratic political institutions. Notably, these results are robust to variety of alternative specifications. We also find evidence of the mechanisms that we believe drive this relationship: increased female representation influences public spending patterns in post-conflict states and improves the perceived quality of governance and elite credibility, which in turn reduce the odds of conflict recurrence. Consequently, our findings support the argument that increasing female representation may help promote durable peace following negotiated settlements to civil conflict.

Gender and Armed Conflict

Several existing studies have examined the influence of gender and gender norms on support for and involvement in violent conflict. One body of research asserts that, either as a result of biology or socialization, women are generally more pacifistic than men and inherently resistant to war and militarism (e.g., Ruddick 1995). Later studies have used this assertion to argue that peace becomes more likely where women are better integrated into a state's political and social institutions (Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly 2015). However, much of the recent literature examining the relationship between gender and conflict asserts that, like men, women are capable of either perpetrating violence or promoting peace (e.g., Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). While this observation

does not rule out the possibility that gender inclusivity in social and political institutions promotes peace, it suggests that any theoretical links between gender and peace should be rooted in claims other than the innate peacefulness of women.

An alternative strand of research largely eschews any connection between women's preferences regarding violence and conflict prevalence and instead highlights the central role that broader social gender dynamics and norms play in the onset or perpetuation of political violence. This research suggests that the existence of patriarchal structures and gender-based inequality within society exerts a profound impact on a state's propensity for political and social violence (Caprioli 2005; Hudson et al. 2009; Melander 2005). Yet, while gender norms may represent a key explanation for social and political violence propensity, they reflect slow-moving societal transformations that occur over periods of decades. As such, they are largely unable to explain variation in violence over relatively short time horizons. In addition, these studies often overlook the potential agency of an important subgroup of actors and appear to disregard literature highlighting gender-based differences in policy preferences, including attitudes toward the use of violence (Brooks and Valentino 2011; Conover and Sapiro 1993; McDermott and Cowden 2002).

A handful of recent studies acknowledge the potential contributions of women (as a distinct group) to securing peace when they are integrated into policymaking and political processes. For example, Caprioli, Nielsen and Hudson (2010) find that post-conflict peace is more durable when women directly participate in the peace process. According to Koch and Fulton's (2011) analysis of established democracies, states with greater numbers of female legislators are less likely to become involved in international armed conflicts and spend less on national defense. Finally, Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly (2015) find that increasing inclusion of women in social and political institutions reduces the risk of civil war recurrence.

We take these studies as our point of departure. Our approach focuses on the potential influence of female legislators on the likelihood of violence, and we apply our argument to the durability of peace in states emerging from violent internal conflicts terminated via negotiated settlement. By focusing on such cases, we can better isolate the influence of changes in political leadership as distinct from the influence of underlying societal factors such as gender norms. Furthermore, we do not make assumptions about women's inherent peacefulness and instead focus on differences in the policy priorities and public perceptions of male and female legislators that have been empirically documented elsewhere. As we elaborate in more detail below, these differences—or rather the outcomes they produce—represent the mechanisms driving the anticipated relationship between female representation and conflict recurrence.

Negotiated Settlements and Female Representation

While our argument centers on the impact of female representation on peace durability, we first discuss the relationship between the termination of civil conflict and subsequent patterns of female representation. Previous studies demonstrate that the termination of a civil conflict often contributes to an increase in the rate of female representation (Hughes 2009; Hughes and Tripp 2015; Tripp 2015). These studies contend that the growth in women's representation following conflict termination results from both changes in the post-conflict state's political institutions and international efforts to increase women's presence within domestic political institutions.

While war termination often creates new opportunities for women to participate in political decision-making, these opportunities are most likely to occur in the context of negotiated settlement. Negotiated settlements often lead to the development and implementation of new governance structures, electoral systems, and laws (particularly in the case of power sharing agreements), which often dramatically expand the population eligible to participate in policymaking and politics (e.g.,

Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001). More specifically, external actors involved in peace negotiations, peacekeeping missions, and in the provision of post-conflict aid often encourage and incentivize states to introduce affirmative action mechanisms, such as gender quotas, that positively influence female political representation rates (Anderson and Swiss 2014; Bush 2011). Organizations such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which provide significant resources to post-conflict states, have focused increasing attention on gender equality and the promotion of gender balance (Krook and True 2012; Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006).

In addition, the inclusion of domestic civil society in the peace process—particularly women's organizations influenced and emboldened by contact with international actors—helps contribute to increasing women's political representation following a peace agreement (Hughes and Tripp 2015, 1531). As a result, ties between domestic civil society groups and transnational women's organizations are capable of bringing women into the peace process and post-conflict political institutions even when warring parties have largely sidelined women (Ellerby 2013; Paffenholz 2014). Consequently, because negotiations often involve actors interested in promoting women's rights and political access, they are more likely to create opportunities for women's inclusion in political decision-making relative to conflicts that terminate via other means.

Table 1 illustrates the relationship between the way in which a conflict terminated and the gender balance in state legislatures for the years 1946 to 2011. Data on post-conflict periods and methods of termination come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (v.4) and UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (v.2) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Kreutz 2010). Data on female representation are from the Women in Parliament Dataset (Paxton, Green, and Hughes 2008). The data demonstrate that five years prior to conflict termination, there is little difference between the rates of female representation in cases of conflict termination via negotiated settlement and cases

where the conflict terminated via other means.[4] While the percentage of female representatives in the legislature increases slightly in both groups at the point of conflict termination, the difference between negotiated settlement cases and other cases remains minimal. However, the differences become apparent in the years following the conflict. At five years post-conflict, female representation in cases terminated via negotiated settlement increases 50% compared to five years prior to termination. By contrast, representation rates only increase by 10% among states where the conflict terminated via other means over the same window of time. Consistent with the literature discussed above, this suggests that conflict termination via negotiated settlement is often an intervention that increases female representation in national legislatures. Moreover, these data suggest that the mode of conflict termination influences post-conflict female representation rates rather than female representation shaping the likelihood of settlement. This observation is important because it reduces concerns about potential selection issues that might bias any observed empirical relationship between female representation rates and peace durability.

Table 1: Female Representation Rates in Post-conflict States

	Negotiated Settlement	No Negotiated Settlement	Difference
5 years prior to termination	6.6	6.8	-0.2
Year of termination	7.8	7.6	-0.2
5 years post-termination	9.9	7.5	+2.41*

Difference reflects difference in representation rates across cases at specified time point.
*=$p \leq 0.05$ in difference of means test between termination types at 5 years post-conflict.

Female Representation and Durable Peace

We now turn to our central argument, which focuses on the potentially positive influence of increasing female representation on the ability of states to break free from the "conflict trap" and secure durable post-conflict peace. States emerging from civil wars are disproportionately likely to

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[4] We compare termination via ceasefire or peace agreement to termination via decisive victory or "low-intensity."

relapse into conflict, perpetuating a cycle of poverty, poor governance, and conflict (Collier et al. 2003). The efficient and effective allocation of state resources to rebuilding infrastructure destroyed during the conflict and meeting the welfare needs of the population represent a key to promoting stability and reducing the risk of conflict recurrence. Relatedly, convincing the population that the new government possesses both the capability and interest to adequately address these issues also shapes the odds of post-conflict peace. Specifically, when perceptions of elite credibility are low and the public maintains a poor opinion of the quality of governance provided by the new government, the risk of return to conflict increases. Governments who can address the needs of the population and promote perceptions of good governance among their citizens are less likely to face renewed challenges to their authority. Particularly following a negotiated settlement, preserving the fragile peace necessitates sustained negotiation and compromise among previous warring parties. By contrast, conflicts ending in decisive victory for one side are less likely to recur because one side has been effectively vanquished, limiting its ability to mount a renewed challenge to its adversaries and signaling the likely fate of other challengers. It is for these reasons that previous studies find that wars terminating in stalemates or negotiated settlements are more likely to recur compared to those ending in decisive victories (e.g., Toft 2009; Walter 2014, 21).

While often overlooked in previous studies of conflict recurrence, civilian attitudes exert a significant influence on strategies that former militant leaders adopt (Mukherjee 2006). Specifically, the level of support insurgent leaders expect to receive from their civilian constituents (including demobilized former troops) is central to their willingness and ability to renege on a settlement and revive the conflict. Indeed, governments explicitly attempt to shape the attitudes of rebels' civilian constituents in order to minimize rebel leaders' ability to draw on this population for support if there is a resumption of violence (484, 489). The provision of public goods and signals of effective

governance represent two ways in which the government can increase public loyalty and potentially weaken loyalty to former insurgent leaders, subsequently reducing the risk of war recurrence.

Moreover, factors that positively influence these perceptions should increase the prospects for securing durable peace. In this section we argue that legislatures with larger proportions of female representatives influence the durability of peace by shaping state spending priorities and alter the odds of conflict recurrence by positively influencing public perceptions of governance quality and elite credibility. To be clear, we are not arguing that increasing female representation represents the only—or even the most common—means of prioritizing social welfare spending and improving perceptions of governance quality. However, several existing studies suggest that increasing the rate of female representation may positively influence these factors, thus influencing the durability of post-conflict peace.

Spending Priorities

The ability to devote scarce state resources to public (rather than private) goods and the implementation of effective development policies is often an essential component of creating durable peace (Collier et al. 2003; Murshed 2002). Yet, rather than devoting state resources to implementing policies that address popular grievances, state leaders often maintain high levels of spending on the security sector because the perceived risk of conflict relapse causes pressures to maintain military readiness (Collier and Hoeffler 2006, 90; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russet 2004; Iqbal 2010, 124-125). Patterns of resource scarcity and underdevelopment that drove the previous conflict may therefore remain unaddressed (or worsen) as the new government diverts financial resources away from infrastructure or social welfare projects that could positively influence peace and stability. States that maintain high levels of military spending at the expense of social spending are more likely to experience conflict recurrence (Collier et al. 2003, 71-72, 184). Similarly, Azam (2000) asserts that

a state's failure to credibly devote substantial resources to redistribution and social welfare increases the odds that it experiences social and political violence. Recent empirical studies investigating this relationship also find that states that devote more resources to the provision of social welfare reduce the risk of violent internal conflict by improving living standards, enhancing social stability, and reducing incentives for violent mobilization against the state (Taydas and Peksen 2012; Thyne 2006). In short, it appears that a state's spending priorities influence its risk of experiencing civil conflict.

Changes in post-conflict spending priorities represent one of the central mechanisms through which we believe that rising female representation rates reduce the risk of conflict recurrence. Specifically, increasing female legislative representation—in the body typically charged with the allocation of state resources—is likely to influence spending priorities, thereby indirectly influencing the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Existing studies demonstrate that female legislators pursue different policies than their male counterparts and can successfully shape policy outputs that reflect these interests as their proportion of seats grows.[5] For instance, states with larger proportions of female legislators tend to provide greater amounts of foreign aid to states experiencing humanitarian disasters (Hicks, Hicks, and Maldonado 2015). Furthermore, legislative bodies with greater numbers of women are both more likely to produce legislation that addresses development, social welfare, and social justice issues (Carroll 2001; Kittilson 2008; Lu and Breuning 2014), and to increase social welfare expenditures (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007). Similarly, developing states with larger proportions of female legislators are more likely to demonstrate improvements in key indicators of social welfare (Swiss, Fallon and Burgos 2012). This literature posits that women legislators are more likely to focus their attention on priorities most directly affecting women's lives: women are disproportionately their families' primary caregivers, disproportionately employed in

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[5] Notably, previous studies suggest that even small increases in women's descriptive representation may exert a substantive impact on policy outcomes (e.g. Crowley 2004; Erickson 1997).

social welfare sectors such as healthcare and education, and typically less directly benefitted by military spending. As such, women legislators are more likely to spend on social welfare due to holding feminist preferences (Carroll 2001) and/or having shared life experience that leads them to acutely value such spending (Mansbridge 1999).

For example, in 1999 South African female legislators protested expanding military expenditures at the expense of spending on economic development and healthcare (Anderlini 2007, 142). Three years later, Parliamentarian Pregs Govender resigned in protest over the government's continued increases in military spending, stating emphatically:

> 24,000 people die every day from poverty, and women and children continue to bear the brunt of this…War makes the profit margins that peace does not. We have to loudly say No! No! No! We will not accept that human life is so easily devalued and dispensable. (Govender 2002)

Govender's efforts to resist increased military spending at the expense of allocations for social welfare programs may illustrate a more general empirical trend. While few existing studies have directly assessed the relationship between female representation rates and the trade-off between military and social spending, Koch and Fulton (2011) find that among democratic states, military spending declines as the proportion of female legislators increases.

Both the anecdotal evidence and recent empirical analyses discussed above suggest that female policymakers are often acutely aware of the implications of the tradeoff between "guns and butter," and more likely than their male counterparts to prioritize the latter. Thus, higher rates of female representation in national legislatures should contribute to greater social welfare expenditures. This does not necessarily imply that female political elites are inherently more pacifistic; rather, it suggests that female leaders may view human security through a different lens than their male counterparts. To the extent that increasing female representation shapes spending priorities, it should therefore also impact the likelihood of civil conflict recurrence.

Perceptions of Governance Quality and Elite Credibility

Perceptions of governance quality, the credibility of elites and policymakers, and overall trust in the new government represent the second set of mechanisms through which we argue that female legislative representation influences the durability of peace. Walter (2014), for example, demonstrates that the presence of institutions that signal accountability and elite commitment to the terms of a negotiated settlement exert a powerful suppressive influence on conflict recurrence. Consistent with this perspective, several recent studies find that variables accounting for the quality and perceptions of quality of governance—including government effectiveness, social spending, and corruption controls—reduce the risk of conflict recurrence (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Fearon 2011; Hegre and Nygård 2015). In a similar manner, numerous studies highlight the importance of elite credibility and inter-elite trust in preserving post-conflict peace. Indeed, power sharing mechanisms and institutions that promote good governance are expected to help promote peace where trust is low and doubts regarding actors' credibility remain high (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Mattes and Savun 2009). Greater inclusivity may promote cooperation and perceptions of credibility by signaling a break from the political status quo.

As we noted above, conflict termination creates new opportunities for women to participate in political decision-making and tends to increase female representation rates. Given that states that are most likely to experience internal conflicts also tend to exclude women from positions of political authority (Melander 2005), increases in the rate of female representation following conflict suggest the introduction of "new faces" into positions of power. Political newcomers are more likely to represent a break with the past and less likely to be viewed as responsible for past political failures and the traumas inflicted on the population during the war. In other words, the replacement of the "old guard" with new political actors signals new opportunities for cooperation and may positively influence public perceptions of the quality of governance in the post-conflict state.

The effect of elite turnover on public perceptions of trust and credibility may be most direct when the new elites are women. Previous research demonstrates that both women and men perceive women as more peaceful than men (Rudman and Goodwin 2004). Whether or not women are actually more committed to peace is largely irrelevant in this context; what matters is that audiences *perceive* that female elites are more likely to choose policies conducive to peace over those conducive to war. Koch and Fulton (2011, 4) similarly note that cross-national research on gender stereotypes finds that audiences perceive that women are generally more cooperative and compassionate. Moreover, audiences generally perceive female candidates and policymakers to be comparatively less corrupt than men (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Treisman 2007), more dedicated to earnest and honest governance (McDermott 1998), and more committed to compromise (Pew Research Center 2015, 6). Previous studies also demonstrate a positive correlation between women's legislative representation and trust in Congress in the US and Latin America (Lawless 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2010). Anecdotal evidence further suggests that citizens in post-conflict states often view female politicians as less corrupt and more dedicated to providing public goods (McGrew et al. 2004). In sum, the perception—if not the reality—that women are more trustworthy than their male counterparts is well established in the existing literature.

The literature reviewed above suggests that increasing the number of female decision-makers should positively influence public perceptions that newly included elites are less encumbered by previous political disputes, more credible, and more likely to govern effectively. Ultimately, as the perceived credibility of the government and the perception of leaders' commitment to good governance increases, popular support for a return to violent rebellion against the state should decline. In other words, these factors should diminish the potential support militant leaders expect from their civilian supporters, thus reducing their incentives to draw the country back into conflict.

Previous studies highlight the fragility of peace following negotiated settlement in contrast to conflicts terminating via other means. In part, the high risk of conflict recurrence endures because the regime often prioritizes security interests over social welfare interests, thus failing to address the factors that motivated or enabled the conflict in the first place. Breaking this conflict trap therefore requires altering spending priorities. Relatedly, perceptions of the quality of governance and belief in elites' commitment to peace influence the risk of conflict recurrence. Where trust remains low and audiences perceive that the government is ineffective, unaccountable, and corrupt, incentives for violence will linger among the population, particularly among former combatants. We argue, however, that increasing female representation in national legislative bodies can improve the prospects of such outcomes and contribute to the prevention of conflict recurrence. Particularly, we assert that female legislative representation influences peace durability following negotiated settlements by altering spending priorities and improving public perceptions of the quality of governance. This produces our central hypothesis: *(H1) Following a negotiated settlement, states with a greater proportion of female representatives in the national legislature are less likely to experience conflict relapse.*

The above discussion suggests a general relationship between female representation in legislatures and peace durability. However, the argument rests in part on the assumption that these legislators have the ability to influence policies or that they are at least perceived to possess such influence. While previous research suggests that legislative bodies in authoritarian and other un-democratic systems can restrain state leaders and successfully shape policy outputs (e.g., Ghandi 2008), legislative influence and authority are typically greater in democratic states. Consequently, the mechanisms we propose should exert a stronger influence in states with more democratic institutions compared to more autocratic states. In other words, the influence of female legislators to affect policy is likely most constrained under conditions of weak legislative authority while female

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legislators are most efficacious in more democratic systems. Similarly, we expect the public to perceive democratic legislatures as comparatively more effective and to view their members' promises to deliver desired policies as more credible. Thus, we anticipate that the relationship between female representation and peace durability is conditioned by a state's prevailing political institutions. This produces our second hypothesis: *(H2) The influence of female representation on the risk of conflict recurrence following civil conflict increases in the context of more democratic political institutions.*

Research Design and Empirical Analyses

Our argument posits that states with higher female representation rates in the national legislature are less likely to experience civil conflict recurrence following a negotiated settlement compared to states whose legislative bodies remain more male dominated. Our argument linking female representation and peace durability following a negotiated settlement focused on two specific mechanisms: national legislatures implementing policies that effectively address the grievances that likely prompted and sustained the initial conflict and public perceptions of good governance and elite credibility. While our primary intention is to demonstrate the relationship between female representation rates and the durability of peace, we first endeavor to demonstrate the validity of our proposed mechanisms. We then turn to our primary analysis, which examines the influence of female representation rates—as well as state spending priorities and perceptions of governance quality—on the durability of peace following negotiated settlement.

Female Representation, Spending and Governance Quality

We begin with an examination of the relationship between the rate of female representation in post-conflict legislatures and measures of government spending priorities and perceptions of the quality of governance. To do so, we first identify a sample of post-conflict cases. We base our sample on

the cases of intrastate and internationalized internal armed conflicts included the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (v.4) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). For inclusion in this dataset, a conflict must center on a stated incompatibility (territorial or governmental) between the host state government and an armed adversary that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year. Because lower intensity conflicts frequently terminate and re-emerge, making it difficult to determine precise end dates, we adopt the commonly employed practice of merging conflict episodes separated by fewer than two years into the same episode. A conflict is coded as terminated when it produces fewer than 25 battle-related deaths each year for two consecutive years. Similarly, conflict recurrence is coded when violence exceeds 25 deaths in a year after at least a two-year lull in the fighting. Because our argument about the influence of female representation is most theoretically pertinent in post-conflict periods following negotiated settlement, we limit our analysis to these cases. Specifically, our sample includes only conflicts coded as terminating via formal peace agreements or ceasefires according to the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (v.2) (Kreutz 2010). Peace periods therefore reflect all years between the termination of a given conflict via a negotiated settlement and its recurrence. After accounting for differences in the temporal window for some of the covariates included in the analysis, our sample represents 58 distinct conflicts occurring in 48 countries between 1946 and 2011.

Our primary explanatory variable is the rate of *Female Representation*. We follow existing studies and include only the proportion of women sitting in the lower (or only) chamber of a state's national legislature during the year. This is a common practice since most upper chambers lack significant political authority due to partisan congruence with the lower chamber and/or because the lower chamber is vested with much greater power over budgets and policymaking (Lijphart 1987). Consequently, this coding captures the proportion of women in the body that is most likely to influence the mechanisms highlighted above. Data for this variable come primarily from the Women

in Parliament Dataset (Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008) but are supplemented with information from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank 2015).[6]

We rely on multiple measures to capture state spending priorities and perceptions of governance quality. First, we construct the variable *Spending Ratio*, which reflects the spending priorities of the national government. To generate the indicator, we divide total annual health expenditures by military expenditures to create a ratio in which larger values reflect greater spending on health relative to the military. We log-transform this ratio measure because of its significant positive skew. These data are taken from the United Nation's UNdata website (United Nations 2016b) and the WDI respectively. We rely on three variables from the World Government Indicators (WGI) database as proxies for perceptions of government credibility (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011).[7] *Accountability* captures perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the selection of their government and to engage in free political expression. *Effectiveness* reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the perceived freedom of the civil service from political control, and the government's commitment to high quality policy formulation and implementation. Finally, *Corruption Control* reflects perceptions of the extent to which political elites exercise public power for private gains, as well as perceptions of the "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. While none of these variables completely captures attitudes towards political

[6] Every country in our post-World War II sample possesses some form of national legislative body at some point during the sample window. During years in which no legislature existed or where it was (temporarily) suspended, we code these cases as missing. However, we recode *Female Representation* as '0' for these observations and include a dummy variable reflecting the presence or absence of a legislature during the year in the analysis. The results are similar (see Appendix).

[7] The WGI measures are available only every other year between 1996 and 2001 and every year thereafter. For our analyses, we linearly interpolate the missing years.

elites, trust in government, or a belief in elites' commitment to peace, they should serve as adequate

proxies for these concepts. Importantly, they should represent a reasonable test of our arguments

because they explicitly capture *perceptions* of the quality of governance in a state, rather than

institutions or laws. The creators generate each indicator by combining multiple individual data

sources (e.g., citizen, expert, and enterprise surveys) through a statistical tool known as an

Unobserved Components Model.[8] Each resulting indicator is a standardized, normally distributed

continuous measure ranging from -2.5 to 2.5.

We include several relevant controls in all of our models of spending and governance quality.

We first control for the state's formal political institutions with an indicator representing institutional

Democracy. We rely on the 21-point Polity2 measure of the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers and

Gurr 2011). To test our second hypothesis, we interact *Democracy* with *Female Representation*. We

control for *Wealth* by including estimated GDP per capita as well as the size of the state's *Population*

(Gleditsch 2002, updated through 2011). We also control for the duration of the previous conflict

with the variable *Conflict Duration* and the time since the last conflict with the variable *Years Since*

Conflict. We include the variables *Natural Resource Revenue* and *Foreign Aid*, both as percentages of

GDP, because they often serve as sources of elite recent-seeking, which can erode governance

quality. These data come from the WDI (World Bank 2015).

Several previous studies also highlight the important role that *Power Sharing* institutions play

in preventing conflict recurrence following negotiated settlement. In part, such agreements may

promote beneficial spending policies, encourage trust among elites, and improve citizens'

perceptions of governance quality. We therefore include a binary indicator accounting for the

presence of such institutions (Cammett and Malesky 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Finally, we

control for the presence of an *Active Conflict* in the county. States may be subject to multiple civil

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[8] For detailed information on the methodology see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011).

conflicts, and the emergence of a new conflict may lead to an increase in military spending and de-prioritization of social welfare spending. It may also erode public perceptions of good governance. This variable is coded '1' if the UCDP/PRIO ACD dataset indicates that a state was host to any additional conflicts (not associated with the previously terminated conflict) during a given year.

We report the results of our spending and governance models in Table 2. In all models, we lag *Female Representation* to account for the time lag between legislative decision-making and policy outcomes.[9] In the interest of space, we only discuss these results in brief. We note that the *Female Representation* rate exerts a positive and statistically significant influence on both the spending variable and on the proxies for public perceptions of governance quality, except in the case of *Effectiveness,* where the coefficient is positive but fails to achieve statistical significance. The *Female Representation* Democracy* interaction term also exerts a positive and statistically significant influence on these outcomes, except in the case of *Accountability,* where the coefficient is positive but fails to achieve statistical significance. Overall, these results suggest that legislatures with larger proportions of female members spend comparatively more on social welfare expenditures relative to military expenditures when compared to legislatures with fewer women, particularly in countries with democratic political institutions. We observe a similar relationship between female representation and our measures of the perception of good governance. These results do not necessarily imply that governments with greater proportions of women are in fact more effective and accountable, or less corrupt. Rather, the results suggest that observers—including civil society organizations, business leaders, and the general public—*perceive* such legislatures as superior in these areas.

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[9] The spending data and WGI measures are available from 1995 and 1996 respectively, thus limiting the time frame of our analysis and substantially reducing the number of observations.

Table 2: Determinants of Spending and Good Governance

	Spending		Accountability		Effectiveness		Corruption Control	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Female Representation$_{(t-1)}$	0.009 **(0.008)**	-0.004 (0.217)	0.004 **(0.023)**	0.002 (0.227)	0.003 (0.081)	-0.002 (0.205)	0.006 **(0.002)**	0.000 (0.495)
Democracy	0.030 **(0.000)**	0.009 (0.190)	0.057 **(0.000)**	0.053 **(0.000)**	0.010 **(0.001)**	0.001 (0.424)	0.010 **(0.003)**	-0.002 (0.344)
Wealth‡	-0.205 **(0.001)**	-0.229 **(0.001)**	0.129 **(0.000)**	0.126 **(0.000)**	0.275 **(0.000)**	0.270 **(0.000)**	0.144 **(0.000)**	0.137 **(0.000)**
Population‡	0.135 **(0.017)**	0.168 **(0.004)**	-0.098 **(0.002)**	-0.096 **(0.003)**	-0.210 **(0.000)**	-0.204 **(0.000)**	-0.166 **(0.000)**	-0.156 **(0.000)**
Conflict Duration‡	0.002 (0.475)	-0.003 (0.447)	-0.001 (0.458)	-0.001 (0.463)	-0.008 (0.258)	-0.009 (0.238)	0.001 (0.423)	0.001 (0.477)
Time Since Conflict‡	0.026 (0.116)	0.032 (0.065)	0.030 **(0.006)**	0.032 **(0.005)**	0.015 **(0.042)**	0.017 **(0.024)**	0.006 (0.257)	0.009 (0.163)
Power Sharing	0.244 **(0.004)**	0.259 **(0.003)**	-0.045 (0.183)	-0.044 (0.187)	-0.010 (0.419)	-0.005 (0.459)	-0.153 **(0.002)**	-0.143 **(0.003)**
Foreign Aid†	0.002 (0.167)	0.002 (0.182)	-0.000 (0.387)	-0.000 (0.356)	-0.001 (0.134)	-0.007 (0.117)	-0.000 (0.452)	-0.000 (0.472)
Resource Rents†	-0.002 (0.226)	-0.001 (0.352)	-0.004 **(0.005)**	-0.004 **(0.005)**	-0.006 **(0.000)**	-0.006 **(0.000)**	-0.005 **(0.000)**	-0.005 **(0.000)**
Active Conflict	-0.140 (0.054)	-0.131 (0.059)	-0.049 (0.122)	-0.042 (0.149)	-0.050 (0.087)	-0.042 (0.122)	-0.101 **(0.016)**	-0.090 **(0.019)**
Female Rep.* Democracy		0.003 **(0.001)**		0.000 (0.128)		0.001 **(0.002)**		0.001 **(0.001)**
Wald X^2	66.87	93.20	294.68	339.32	271.57	295.88	96.23	109.22
R2	0.22	0.24	0.54	0.54	0.51	0.52	0.39	0.41
N	427	427	463	463	463	463	463	463

Results from Prais-Winsten regression models with AR1 corrections. Coefficients with *p*-values (one-tailed test) in parentheses. *P*-values $\leq$ 0.05 in Bold. †=%GDP; ‡=Natural log

Female Representation and Peace Durability

Having established the relationship between female representation, spending, and governance outcomes, we turn to an empirical test of our primary argument. According to our hypotheses, we expect that increasing *Female Representation* rates will increase peace durability following conflicts

terminated via negotiated settlement.[10] We empirically examine the impact of this variable—as well

as the impact of the outcome variables examined in Table 2—on the durability of peace. We lag the

Female Representation variable for one period in all models to account for the likely time lag between

changes in the composition of government and changes in public attitudes or government spending

decisions that may shape the odds of conflict.

In our analyses, we rely on the same sample defined above and utilize many of the same

control variables, including *Democracy*, *Population*, *Conflict Duration*, *Active Conflict*, and *Power Sharing*.

However, we include several additional predictors demonstrated by previous studies to influence

peace durability following civil conflict. We control for *Territorial Conflict* using the indicator included

in the UCDP datasets. We include the variable *Resource Distribution*, which is a binary indicator

accounting for whether the conflict focused on a disagreement over the distribution of natural

resources or natural resource-derived revenues (Rustad and Binningsbø 2012). We also include the

variable *UN Peacekeepers* to account for the presence of a United Nations Peacekeeping force (United

Nations 2016a). Other studies noting a relationship between female representation and violence

suggest that the rate of female representation may simply reflect norms of greater societal gender

equality within the state, which may in turn influence a state's risk of involvement in conflict

(Melander 2005). We therefore account for gender equality by including *Secondary Education Ratio*,

which serves as a proxy for societal gender equality. (World Bank 2015).[11]

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[10] Substituting the average female representation rate of the first five post-conflict years, which helps

account for the growth of female representation overtime, yields similar results (see Appendix).

[11] As robustness checks, we also control for other factors that may influence the number of women

in a legislature and potentially the risk of conflict recurrence. Controls for legislative dominance by a

left-oriented party and the presence of gender quotas do not change the results (see Appendix).

Table 3: Determinants of Post-conflict Peace Durability

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Female	-0.060	-0.065	-0.016	-0.062	-0.062	-0.053	-0.057
Representation$_{(t-1)}$	**(0.016)**	**(0.009)**	(0.306)	(0.105)	(0.068)	(0.104)	(0.077)
Democracy	-0.000	-0.025	0.075	0.042	-0.019	-0.040	-0.046
	(0.457)	(0.313)	(0.153)	(0.339)	(0.493)	(0.247)	(0.221)
Resource	0.501	0.523	0.451	0.776	0.694	0.657	0.557
Distribution	(0.128)	(0.144)	(0.175)	**(0.050)**	**(0.041)**	**(0.050)**	(0.073)
Territorial	-0.693	-0.667	-0.723	-1.439	-1.557	-1.588	-1.660
Conflict	(0.124)	(0.166)	(0.154)	(0.110)	(0.054)	**(0.048)**	**(0.035)**
Population‡	0.057	0.067	0.093	0.285	0.246	0.328	0.261
	(0.333)	(0.287)	(0.231)	**(0.038)**	(0.063)	**(0.022)**	**(0.039)**
UN Peacekeepers	-0.132	-0.242	0.318	0.182	-0.915	-0.892	-0.690
	(0.392)	(0.295)	(0.246)	(0.381)	(0.159)	(0.114)	(0.173)
Power Sharing	-0.308	-0.189	-0.325	0.117	0.341	0.278	0.185
	(0.254)	(0.351)	(0.256)	(0.421)	(0.360)	(0.328)	(0.377)
Conflict	-0.280	-0.315	-0.359	-0.336	-0.434	-0.510	-0.476
Duration‡	**(0.008)**	**(0.008)**	**(0.003)**	(0.056)	**(0.023)**	**(0.016)**	**(0.015)**
Active Conflict	0.878	1.141	0.893	-0.284	1.459	1.453	1.262
	(0.067)	**(0.035)**	(0.061)	(0.393)	**(0.028)**	**(0.023)**	**(0.046)**
Secondary		0.003	0.004	-0.025	-0.013	-0.002	-0.009
Education Ratio		(0.386)	(0.367)	(0.072)	(0.207)	(0.442)	(0.277)
Female Rep.*			-0.013				
Democracy			**(0.011)**				
Spending Ratio				-0.847			
				(0.039)			
Accountability					-0.779		
					(0.120)		
Effectiveness						-1.204	
						(0.014)	
Corruption							-0.854
Control							**(0.029)**
Wald X^2	16.14	19.28	26.10	31.43	42.42	41.80	45.16
N	737	675	675	442	483	483	483

Results from Cox Proportional Hazard models. Coefficients with *p*-values (one-tailed) in parentheses. *P*-values ≤ 0.05 in bold. Standard errors clustered on country in all models. †=%GDP; ‡=Natural log.

Our argument focuses on the impact of female representation on the duration of time until war resumes (peace failure). To assess this relationship, we rely on conventional Cox proportional hazard (CPH) models using time (in days) until the resumption of conflict or until an observation is censored (exits the dataset) as the outcome. While a number of parametric and nonparametric estimation options are available, we select a CPH model because it is more flexible than parametric

approaches and does not require us to make assumptions about the baseline hazard. We report the results from the CPH models in Table 3.[12] Rather than report hazard rates, we report coefficients for each variable. Positive values suggest that a given predictor increases the risk of conflict recurrence, while negative values reduce this risk.

Model 9 represents a baseline model evaluating the overall influence of *Female Representation* on conflict recurrence. The results from this model suggest that the proportion of female legislators has a negative and statistically significant influence on the risk of peace failure. In other words, increasing female representation increases the expected duration of peace following negotiated settlements. Model 10 introduces the control for *Secondary Education Ratio*. Despite accounting for this variable, the relationship between *Female Representation* and peace durability still obtains, providing support for our first hypothesis. This result improves our confidence that we are not simply observing a spurious relationship driven by societal gender norms: states whose legislatures include larger numbers of female members are more likely to enjoy longer periods of post-conflict peace than those with fewer female members.

Model 11 introduces the *Female Representation*Democracy* interaction term. The results indicate that the relationship between female representation and peace durability is conditioned by the presence of more democratic political institutions. In order to examine the effects of this interaction on peace durability, we present the linear predictions in Figure 1. The figure indicates that the suppressive effect of women's representation on the risk of conflict recurrence increases as a state's political institutions become more democratic. Moreover, the effect only appears to be significant (fully below the zero line) once a state's political institutions become at least modestly democratic (e.g. Polity2 = 3).

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[12] Standard diagnostics reveal no significant violations of the proportional hazard assumption.

Figure 1: Conditional Influence of Female Representation on Conflict Recurrence


Figure 1 shows the impact of a unit change in *Female Representation* on the risk of conflict recurrence over the range of the *Democracy* indicator based on linear predictions derived from Model 11.

These results provide strong support for our hypotheses: the durability of post-conflict peace following a negotiated settlement increases as female representation increases, particularly in democratic states. However, we also argue that this relationship is driven primarily by the impact that increasing female representation exerts on perceptions of governance and on spending priorities. This proposition presupposes that these factors exert an independent influence on the longevity of post-conflict peace. While previous studies have demonstrated these relationships, we examine the influence of our proxy measures for these factors on the duration of post-conflict peace in Models 12 through 15. Model 12 includes the variable *Spending Ratio*, which is both negative and statistically significant. This suggests that states devoting larger proportions of annual expenditures to social welfare relative to the military enjoy longer periods of post-conflict peace. Our proxies for perceived good governance are negatively associated with conflict recurrence. While *Effectiveness* and *Corruption Control* achieve statistical significance, *Accountability* fails to do so.

Overall, and consistent with previous studies (Fearon 2011; Hegre and Nygärd 2015; Walter 2014, 1258), these results imply that as perceptions of good governance increase, the risk of conflict recurrence declines.[13] Moreover, consistent with our argument, the inclusion of these indicators generally weakens the relationship between *Female Representation* and conflict recurrence. Specifically, we asserted that the impact of female representation on peace durability largely works by influencing spending priorities and shaping public perceptions of good governance and elite credibility in post-conflict states, and these results support that assertion.

We plot the survival curves from Model 11 in Figure 2. The figure shows the estimated proportion of cases with the specified characteristics that survive (remain at peace) until a given time point. We illustrate the effect of legislative gender diversity by showing the survival rates for the mean value of *Female Representation* in the sample (10.5%) as well one standard deviation above (18.5%) and below (2.5%) the mean in both democracies (left-panel) and non-democracies (right-panel).[14] The figure highlights the strong positive influence of *Female Representation* on peace durability following a negotiated settlement among states with more democratic political institutions. While there is little variation in the influence of this variable in the hypothetical non-democratic state illustrated in right panel, it is clear that higher rates of *Female Representation* substantially improve the survival rate among modestly democratic states. For instance, at ten years post-conflict approximately 85% of democratic states with a *Female Representation* rate one standard deviation above the sample mean survive without experiencing conflict relapse, while only 68% of autocratic

[13] The lack of a significant relationship between the accountability measure and conflict risk is consistent with Fearon (2011). These studies also find that institutional measures of good governance reduce conflict risk; robustness checks using these measures yield similar results to our primary findings (see Appendix).

[14] Survival curves are based on Polity2 scores of "6" for democracy and "0" for non-democracy.

states with the same *Female Representation* rate survive to that point. At the mean value of *Female Representation*, roughly 72% of democratic cases and only 60% of autocratic cases survive until the ten-year mark. And at low levels of female representation only around 45% of democratic cases and 58% of autocratic cases survive. The difference between the effects of female representation in the context of democratic versus non-democratic states is consistent with our expectations. The greater independence and authority of legislatures in more democratic states allow the representatives in those institutions to exert comparatively greater influence over policy outcomes compared to their counterparts in more autocratic states. Consequently, we note that very low rates of female representation in more democratic states appear to jeopardize peace while greater female representation tends to make post-conflict peace more durable.

Figure 2: Survival Curves from Cox Proportional Hazard Models

The figure demonstrates the estimated survival rates for hypothetical states in which the conflict terminated in a peace agreement with *Female Representative* set at the sample mean, and one standard deviation above and below the sample mean for a democratic state (left panel) and non-democratic state (right panel). Estimates derived from Model 11.

With respect to the control variables, we note that in multiple specifications *Conflict Duration* is negative and significant. This suggests that longer—and presumably more costly—conflicts are less likely to recur, as are those in countries emerging from *Territorial Conflict*. In contrast, another *Active Conflict* negatively affects peace durability, while the presence of *UN Peacekeepers* often exerts a negative but inconsistent effect. Somewhat surprisingly, *Democracy* appears unrelated to peace duration except when interacted with female representation. Given the results for the *Effectiveness* measure, this suggests that perceptions of democratic governance may be more important for preserving post-conflict peace than the institutions themselves.

Finally, it is plausible that *Female Representation* is systematically correlated with unobservable factors related to the time since the previous conflict, thus biasing our results. To account for this possibility, we reanalyze our model using an instrumental variables approach. Specifically, we employ an IV probit model with controls for temporal dependence, including both the one-year lag of the regional average of female representation and presence of nationally-legislated gender quotas as our exogenous instruments. The results, discussed in the online Appendix, are robust to this approach.

Conclusion

The arguments presented above posited that negotiated settlements are more durable in states with more gender inclusive political leadership. We argue that this occurs because, compared to other forms of conflict termination, negotiated settlements create more new opportunities for women's incorporation into positions of political leadership and the increase in female representation provides distinct prospects for breaking the conflict trap. Most importantly, we argue that increases in the rate of female representation reduce the risk of conflict occurrence by implementing policies that continue to address the conditions that drove the initial conflict and by improving perceptions of trust and credibility among political elites. We find strong empirical support for both our general

argument regarding the relationship between female representation rates and peace durability as well as the mechanisms that we believe drive this relationship: the influence of women's representation on spending priorities and perceptions of good governance. We also find that these relationships are particularly strong in democratic states, which we have argued results from the greater authority and influence exercised by legislatures in states with more democratic political institutions.

There is no guarantee that including more women will necessarily lead to these outcomes. Women's abilities to signal trust and credibility, their specific policy preferences, and their ability to implement these policies likely varies according to political and social contexts. Moreover, our argument focuses on the average attitudes and attributes of women that have been highlighted in previous literature, and our results reflect the average effect of the inclusion of such women in legislatures. Thus, an interesting question with respect to greater inclusivity as a mechanism for altering spending priorities and public perceptions is whether all women or all minority groups necessarily exert the same effect on peace durability. Distinct effects may result if different groups of women within a legislature hold competing preferences or if women's presence in decision-making roles is perceived as contrary to traditional gender stereotypes and roles, potentially producing a backlash against their inclusion and the policies they pursue. Additionally, although we have focused our attention on how the inclusion of women can lead to greater credibility among post-conflict bargaining partners, a complimentary logic may extend to the inclusion of other "out-groups." That is, similar to the logic we put forth, incorporating other previously marginalized groups may improve perceptions of governance quality and result in the creation of policies that reduce the risk of war recurrence. Alternatively, however, the inclusion of these groups may provoke a contrary reaction that undermines peace. Such issues should be addressed more directly in future studies.

Finally, our study points to two important policy applications. First, we highlight the potential agency of women within the post-conflict political process. In contrast to studies that

focus on gender norms or hierarchies as a causal explanation for peace, our argument and analysis place the roles of women at the forefront of policymaking. While underlying gender norms likely exert a strong influence on the overall propensity for violence within a society, norms are notoriously sticky and evolve slowly over time. Thus, norms alone are unlikely to strongly influence the propensity for a state emerging from civil conflict to relapse into violence. However, conflict termination—particularly via negotiated settlement—presents a wealth of new opportunities for women to become involved in political and policymaking processes. Thus, women's formal political representation in these cases rapidly outpaces changes in societal norms. Our results suggest that this increase in female representation—rather than just underlying norms—influences the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Accordingly, our results highlight the important role that the inclusion of women in political processes plays in helping to resolve the conflict trap and secure more durable peace. From a policy standpoint, our results support advocacy for affirmative action policies that encourage or include more women in political decision-making bodies in post-conflict states.

Second, in line with previous studies (Taydas and Peksen 2012; Thyne 2006), we demonstrate the importance of social spending to prevent conflict recurrence. However, we also note that many post-conflict states appear unable or unwilling to engage in such spending despite the demonstrated benefits to achieving long-term peace. Furthermore, such spending need not occur exclusively when women are elected to office: certainly men can prioritize social welfare spending, too. Consequently, from a policy standpoint, our results broadly support government interventions that invest in and improve social welfare programs in post-conflict states.

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